

Table 4. Income Transfer Programs in Campinas, Brazil

Program	Target population	Activities	Conditionality	Coverage	Benefit
Income Transfer Programs with Family Focus					
<i>Bolsa Família</i> - Federal/Municipal	Families with monthly income per capita below R\$ 120	- different municipalities offer activities geared to the needs of families such as literacy classes, health and nutrition workshops, income generating activities	- school age children should show 85% of school attendance - bi-annual family health checkups :e.g. immunizations, pre-natal and nursing care	24,000 families	R\$ 15 monthly per child/adolescent up to 15 years of age Families with per capita income up to R\$ 60 receive the i basici benefit of R\$ 50 monthly
<i>Programa Garantia de Renda Familiar Mínima</i> — Municipal				3,118 families	R\$ 35 per person R\$ 125 average per family for 18 months
<i>Programa Renda Cidadã</i> — State	families with monthly income per capita below R\$ 100 selected by the Municipal Social Services	-workshops, educational activities depending on the interest of the participant families	- attend the workshops, participate in activities -attend monthly meetings at the implementing NGOs - be registered in the ProSocial database	1,000 families	Up to R\$ 60 per family for 12 months. May be renewed for another year
Special Income Transfer Programs					
<i>Benefício de Prestação Continuada</i> (BPC) ñ Federal	8,300 persons over 65 years of age and population with special needs who cannot work				A minimum salary per person
<i>Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho</i>	Children from 7 to 16 years old	- school attendance and participation in	-school attendance and participation in	245 families including 312 children	R\$ 180 monthly per family

<i>Infantil—</i> <i>PETI—</i> (Federal /Municipal)	who had been in the labor market	after school activities	after-school activities		
<i>Programa</i> <i>Convivência</i> <i>e Cidadania</i> —Municipal	Children from 12 to 18 years old who had been in the labor market or begging	- after school activities and workshops provided by program coordinators - participants can be in the program until they are 18	-participate in after school activities in the Citizenship Community Center	60 families	R\$ 180 per family
Income Transfer Programs with Focus on Youth					
<i>Programa</i> <i>Jovem—</i> Municipal		-technology training to become tutors in the jovem.com units	- participate in technology training and workshops -tutor youths and adults in the jovem.com units that offer free internet access	400 youths	R\$ 150
Youth Action <i>Programa</i> <i>Ação Jovem</i> — State	Youth 15 to 24 years old who have not completed basic or secondary education and socially vulnerable - Family's monthly income up to two minimum salaries.	-attend school or job training courses	- participate in job training	2,500 youths in the city and 100,743 statewide	R\$ 60 monthly for 12 months that can be renewed for another 12.
Youth Agent <i>Projeto</i> <i>Agente</i> <i>Jovem—</i> Federal	Youth 15 to 17 years of age	-attend and participate on program's activities	- participate in activities promoting society's development, family and social interaction, job training.	425 youths and 112,536 countrywide	R\$ 65 monthly for each participant - additional funds sent to the entities offering activities.

Source: Municipal Government of Campinas - Secretariat of Social Development, Brazil, 2006.

geared towards the bottom quintile of the income distribution, with initiatives to reduce economic inequality, ensure better access to education, jobs and justice, and build social capital. CCTs are aligned with these suggestions by targeting the poor, increasing their income, and providing tools for the youth to get jobs or continue their education.

Cash Transfer Programs in Campinas

Brazil has seen a number of income transfer programs targeting the poor, with programs originating at municipal, state and federal levels. In 1995, Campinas was a pioneer in implementing the Minimum Income Program (*Programa de Renda Mínima*), a CCT targeted to families in extreme poverty and socially at-risk (World Bank 2001). Presently, there are in operation in Campinas eight types of Conditional Cash Transfer programs including both state and federal programs. Table 4 shows these programs classified by program focus.

In Campinas, Youth Action and Youth Agent Program are the main CCT programs focusing on youth. Table 5 summarizes features of the two programs.⁵

Discussion of the Two Programs

Though evaluation of Youth Action is underway (due later in 2007), it is possible to draw on the experience of the income transfer programs coordinator of the Campinas municipal government to gain some insight.

Main goals. Both Youth Agent and Youth Action focus on youth development, however with different aims. Youth Action targets out-of-school youth, the main goal being to get them back in school to complete basic and secondary education. The Youth Agent program, for its part, provides financial incentives to promote inclusion in the local social protection network so that youth will become active members of society, developing a life project and assuming a positive role in their communities. Both programs offer cultural and sports activities as well as job training.

Benefits. Both CCT programs are designed to help youth learn to play an active role in improving own their socio-economic condition, with programs to help them become active members of their communities (e.g. family guidance) and improve their schooling and job opportunities (e.g. professional training activities). This, it is hoped, will reduce youth's

⁵ Despite differences, all CCT programs must make the following design decisions (based on Ayala Consulting 2005): (1) Identify potential program beneficiaries and where they are located. If this information is not available, provide mechanisms for obtaining this information. In addition, it is important to know what education and health services are already available to this population segment. (2) Identify institutions that will be directly involved with program execution and gather their support. For example, define how existing agencies will work with health and education ministries. (3) Determine the amount of the benefits and how they will be delivered. The majority of CCT programs deliver cash directly to the women head of households. In Brazil, for example, this payment is done through a magnetic bank card. (4) Establish program components and conditionalities depending on policy goals. (5) Develop mechanisms to monitor compliance and actions to be taken where compliance is deficient. (6) Develop clear program exit strategies for beneficiaries.

Table 5. Main Features of Youth Agent and Youth Action Programs in Campinas, Brazil

	Program Youth Agent (<i>Projeto Agente Jovem de Desenvolvimento</i> - 1999)	Program Youth Action (<i>Ação Jovem</i>) - 2004
Beneficiaries	Youth 15 to 17 years old in the following situations: - priority to out of school youth - who are participants or had participated in social assistance programs (this measure covers adolescents and youth from other programs such as PETI also promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger) - who are in situation of vulnerability and personally and socially at-risk - who are exiting or still under protective or socio-educational measures - who come from programs that address commercial sexual exploitation of minors -10% of vacancies from each municipality have to be given to adolescents with special needs	Youths between 15 and 24 years old who have not completed basic or secondary education and who are socially vulnerable, living in family with monthly income up to 2 minimum salaries. It also includes youth under probation
Program's Goals	to promote family cohesion to motivate the youth to be an active member of society to help the youth to improve their community and to contribute to decrease the rates of violence, drug use, sexually transmissible diseases, HIV and teenage pregnancy to prepare participants 18 and older to enter labor market	Address social vulnerability affecting youth from low-income families in Campinas (SEADS 2004) Main goal is social inclusion through formal education
Monitoring	Sectoral Coordination of Evaluation and Control Visits to participating NGOs and reports Bi-monthly meetings with all program coordinators and monitors and with Income Transfer Programs coordinator	Attendance is closely monitored and reported by implementing agencies After being selected, their families are included in the ProSocial database
Financing	Funds transferred from Federal to Municipal Government reached R\$ 112,535,819.94 (near US\$ 51million) for 1,711 municipalities	State provided R\$ 141.2 million (near US\$ 80 million) for 2005-2006

Source: Municipal Secretariat of Social Development of Campinas, São Paulo State Secretariat of Development and Social Assistance (SEADS), Brazil, 2006.

exposure to violence and vulnerability. Priority is given to areas where there is higher incidence of crime and violent acts involving youth (SEADS 2004). Evaluations are underway to see if the incidence of violence has fallen and gauge the extent that such declines are program effects.

Another justification for programs targeting vulnerable youth is that job choices that affect schooling decisions rely mainly on the job experiences of kin. The very poor may not

have access to information on jobs or services that would help them make better choices (de Janvry & Sadoulet 2005). Both Youth Agent and Youth Action expose beneficiaries to more information on furthering their education as well as on job opportunities that they can typically get from home. In a larger sense, targeting the most vulnerable and providing them financial incentive, the programs help to reduce inequality, key to curbing the spread of violence (Heinemann & Verner 2006; Knowles & Behrman 2006). And finally, the conditionality provides an incentive for recipients to take an active role in improving their condition and moving toward financial independence. This feature of CCT programs makes the program widely acceptable to most constituencies because the program is viewed as temporary, rather than a program promoting ongoing dependence.

Affordability. Affordability has to do with the fiscal costs of change as well as social and political costs. Unfortunately, while there is available funding for both programs and their continuing expansion,⁶ there is a lack of information on the overall costs of these programs, possibly because of the decentralized implementation.

Despite limited cost-benefit information on economic returns to investment in youth, available evidence on investments such as in formal schooling, adult basic education and literacy, and other types of school-based investments suggest, in general terms, that economic returns are at least as high as investments in other sectors (Knowles & Behrman 2006). However, because vulnerable youth may not be reached in programs offered in formal schools, it is more difficult to get reliable information on the effects of investments in youth, or more importantly the cost of failure to invest in youth. More information is needed on the costs and benefits of programs such as Youth Agent and Youth Action, not only from the perspective of participants but also from a social perspective, in terms of crime reduction and economic development.

Capacity to implement. Implementation capacity relates to the human and physical capacity to implement the program or policy. As CCT programs include conditions of school attendance or other activities, there must be a service structure in place for participants to access. As a thriving urban center, Campinas has a strong network of service providers with many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental agencies that can provide youth activities in addition to state and municipal schools and a Center for Professional Training which guarantees access to education. In Campinas, both programs are executed by NGOs and government social service agencies, which provide the necessary human and financial resources. There is also administrative support from the Youth Coordination and Coordination of Income Transfer programs.

Institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements involve questions of how

⁶ Money transfers for participants and activities of Youth Agent are financed by the federal government with funds from the National Social Assistance Fund created by Law n. 8.742 from 1993 to support social assistance programs. Youth Action is co-financed by the State of São Paulo, and it received R\$ 141.2 million in 2006. The municipal government of Campinas receives every month R\$ 150,000.00 in transfers from the State Government to cover 2,500 youths in the Youth Action and R\$ 27,625.00 for the Youth Agent participants.

decisions are made and who is responsible for program administration.⁷ The Youth Agent and Youth Action program guidelines, including access criteria and available budget are defined by the executing agency, in this case the São Paulo, and for Youth Agent, the Federal Government. These guidelines are established on the basis of specific legislation tailored for each program. The local administration in Campinas maintains regular communication with the State and Federal coordinators of the two programs in order to achieve established goals and address various issues of program operation. The municipality monitors the work of the executing agencies at the municipal level and maintains a dialogue on needed changes.

Political support for the programs. While still very recent, youth development has been supported by all levels of government with existing and pending legislation.⁸ One important advance in this regard was establishment of the Department of Youth Affairs within the SEAS (State Secretariat of Social Assistance), to formulate programs for a segment of the population not served by the SEAS, the Youth agent being one of them (Inter-American Development Bank 2005).

Monitoring and evaluation. In Campinas, the implementing NGOs and government agencies monitor conditionalities and activities, registering school attendance and evaluating beneficiaries' participation in required activities. Regular meetings are scheduled to discuss program operations, program performance, and the extent to which programs are reaching their goals. Having conditionalities monitored is an essential part of CCT programs to ensure that participants continue to follow the behaviors necessary to improve their situation and eventually exit the program.

Despite observed positive effects, there have also been problems in implementation, mainly regarding the design of social assistance programs and associated administration. For example, the implementation of cash transfer programs without coordination among municipal, estate and federal levels of government has resulted in multiple initiatives with different proposals, different beneficiary registries, sometimes serving the same families. Had these programs been better coordinated, they might have had a greater impact. The municipal government of Campinas is working with other levels of government to address these issues.

⁷ In 2003 the estate government of São Paulo has made important changes in the administration of social programs with the goal to streamline their administration and distribution of resources. It established a partnership with two main goals: securing basic social protection and special protection to address situations involving social risk, in a partnership with the state and municipal governments in a co-financing system. The municipalities submit their plan based on the particular vulnerability characteristics of the target population as well as on the local context. The actions are co-financed and are duly monitored and transparent with information available on line (SEADS 2004).

⁸ In January 1999, the Secretariat of State for Social Assistance (SEAS) of the Ministry of Social Security and Social Assistance was raised to a level equivalent to that of a ministry, thus giving it greater visibility, dynamism, and autonomy of action. The SEAS has been taking comprehensive action aimed at social inclusion and protection of those segments of the population felt to be most vulnerable, focusing on the family unit rather than on its individual members (Inter-American Development Bank 2005).

Implications for the Future of CCT Programs in Campinas

Among the proposals municipal government has discussed to improve income transfer programs, there is emphasis on:

- Establishment of a single amount to be set as reference to supplement existing scholarships, taking into account the focus of each program (e.g. family, youth, child labor, etc).
- Discussions with other government levels (state and federal) regarding municipal government's management of other income transfer programs.
- Integration of registries used by each program by implementing municipality's own social database (*Cadastro Social*).
- Making payments through single magnetic bank card or same banking agency.
- Integrating these programs with activities focusing on work and income generation.

These proposed changes make it possible to coordinate actions at all levels of government, so State policies can be designed to take into account the reality and the development possibilities of each municipality given other social assistance programs in operation. Further discussions are ongoing in terms of improving CCT programs so they can provide job opportunities, continue to reduce poverty and improve the education of beneficiaries, including the youth older than 15.

Finally, in terms of improving educational opportunities at the secondary level and expanding *Bolsa Familia* to reach youth, the government has been discussing the possibility of adapting the program's education incentives by (i) providing bonuses for secondary school graduation, (ii) increasing the value of the transfer for older youth to stay in school (recognizing the higher opportunity costs), and/or (iii) extending attendance conditionalities to youth age 16-18, which would capture secondary school enrolment" (World Bank 2006).

Conclusions

Conditional Cash Transfer programs have grown, taking many forms depending on the needs to be addressed, the context, and the time. CCTs appear to have helped the poor improve their education and health in ways that might not have occurred had the benefit been offered unconditionally. In addition, "by modernizing their operations, including the adoption of unified beneficiary registries, credible enforcement of poverty targeting and conditionalities, and strategic use of evaluations, these programs have introduced many innovations in social assistance policies" (de la Brière & Rawlings 2006, p.22).

Complementary CCT programs aimed at the most vulnerable youth can only exist with political support strong enough to survive changes in administration and to guarantee necessary resource allocation. Inasmuch as the programs involve transfers of funds to young people, implementation requires coordinated participation by all three levels of government as well as by organized civil society. Because administration of these programs is decentralized to the municipality, their quality may vary widely. The Campinas example suggests that a

large urban center is likely to need this type of program, at the same time that administration and in particular, coordination with other levels of government, can be very challenging.

By requiring conditions that involve access to certain services and programs (e.g. job training, attendance in public schools) to receive a cash benefit, CCT programs encourage eligible beneficiaries and other stakeholders to put pressure on governments to improve public services. This may in turn enhance local capacity to address the needs of its most vulnerable population. Youth Agent and Youth Action are relatively new complementary CCT programs and while their implementation is still ongoing, they appear to be a useful tool for governments to make education and training more affordable for low-income youth. CCT programs such as *Bolsa Família* and *Progres-a-Oportunidades* have also contributed, indirectly, to identification of vulnerable youth who have been left in the margins of the school system and other social assistance programs. Once identified, programs can be planned and implemented to foster development of human capital among this marginalized group.

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